





Volume 30, Issue 1 
  
Insider patent holder licensing in an oligopoly market with different cost 




Ming-Chung Chang  
Department of Risk Management, Kainan University, Taiwan 
Abstract 
The issue of the optimal licensing contract in firms having different cost structures is studied when the innovator is a 
producing patent holder who has three alternative licensing strategies, namely, the fixed-fee, royalty rate, and auction 
strategies. We conclude that the auction licensing strategy is not the best strategy when the innovator is a producing 
patent holder. This finding differs from that of Kabiraj (2004) where the auction licensing method is the optimal 
licensing strategy when the innovator is a non-producing patent holder. However, when we only compare two of the 
licensing methods, namely, the fixed-fee licensing method and the royalty licensing method, we conclude that if the 
inside innovator licenses to only some of the firms, then the royalty licensing method will be the best strategy. This 
result is different from that of Fosfuri and Roca (2004), who concluded that if only some of the licensees obtain a 
licensing contract, then the fixed-fee licensing method will be the best choice for a producing patent holder.
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     1. Introduction 
Technology licensing is an important business action from the perspective of the 
inventor and innovator.    Rostoker (1984) surveyed the licensing mode of the firm 
and concluded that 13% of the sample used the fixed-fee licensing mode, 39% used 
the royalty licensing mode, and 46% used the two-part (fee plus royalty) licensing 
mode.    Since technology transfer through auctions is less discussed than the other 
methods and the auction is also an important licensing mode, in this paper we focus 
on the licensing effect of an auction. 
The seminal literature on technology transfer first started with Arrow (1962), who 
discussed the technology transfer effect for the royalty licensing method and found 
that  the  innovator  has  a  larger  licensing  profit  in  a  competitive  market  than  in  a 
monopolistic market.    The contribution of licensing in a competitive industry based 
on comparing the fixed-fee licensing method with the royalty licensing  method is 
shown in Kamien  and  Tauman (1984).    However, the  above two studies lack the 
firm’s strategic interaction. 
The  licensing  literature  can  be  divided  into  where  the  innovator  is  either  a 
non-producing  patent  holder  or  a  producing  patent  holder.    One  important 
contribution  of  the  former  type  is  that  by  Kamien  and  Tauman  (1986).    The 
innovator  uses  a  fixed-fee  or  a  royalty  rate  to  transfer  technology  to  firms  which 
produce homogeneous goods and engage in Cournot or Bertrand competition.    The 
result shows that it is good for both the innovator’s profit and the consumer’s surplus 
to use the fixed-fee licensing method. 
Some  studies  discuss  the  licensing  effect  of  the  auction  licensing  method.   
Kamien et  al. (1992) considered three kinds of licensing contract - the fixed-fee, 
royalty, and auction - using a generalized demand function.    They concluded that the 
auction licensing  contract is better than the fixed-fee licensing contract, while the 
royalty  licensing  contract  is  inferior  to  each  of  the  other  two  licensing  contracts.   
Muto (1993) found that the royalty licensing mode dominates other licensing modes 
when the licensees have differentiated products and engage in Bertrand competition.   
Kabiraj (2004) set up the licensees as having the same cost structure and the licensor 
as a non-producing patent holder in order to choose the optimal licensing contract.   
His results show that the auction licensing mode is superior to other modes for the 
non-drastic case. 
Articles in which the innovator is a producing patent holder include those by Katz 
and  Shapiro  (1985),  Rockett  (1990),  Wang  (1998),  and  Fosfuri  and  Roca  (2004).   
Generally speaking, the royalty licensing method is the best licensing method when 
the  innovator  is  a  producing  patent  holder.    However,  Fosfuri  and  Roca  (2004) 
concluded  that  the  fixed-fee  licensing  method  might  be  optimally  chosen  when  a producing patent holder licenses a new technology to only some of the licensees. 
In our paper the innovator is a producing patent holder and each firm has different 
cost  structures.    The  licensor  chooses  the  optimal  licensing  strategy  among  the 
fixed-fee, royalty rate, and auction licensing strategies.    Our results show that when a 
producing patent holder licenses to only certain of the firms, the royalty licensing 
contract is the best strategy.    This conclusion differs from the finding of Fosfuri and 
Roca  (2004).    Besides,  we  also  conclude  that  when  three  licensing  contracts  are 
available, providing royalty licensing to both firms is the optimal choice.    In other 
words, the auction licensing contract is not the best licensing method.    This result, 
however,  contrasts  with  that  of  Kabiraj  (2004),  who  concluded  that  of  the  three 
available  licensing  strategies,  the  optimal  licensing  contract  for  a  non-producing 
patent holder is the auction. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.    In Section 2 we set up the 
model  and  discuss  the  three  licensing  strategies.    Section  3  analyzes  the  optimal 
licensing contract in term of maximizing the total profit of the patent holder.    Section 
4 provides the conclusion. 
 
2. The model setup and analysis 
We consider a three-firm game with one firm producing the patent and product, 
Firm L, and two manufacturing firms referred to as Firm M and Firm H.    There are 
different costs among them, with firm L at cL, firm M at cM, and firm H at cH, where 0 
< cL < cM < cH < a.    To simplify, let cL = c – 2e, cM = c – e, and cH = c.    If Firm L 
licenses to competitors, this will result in a reduction in each firm’s unit cost to c - 2e.   
The parameter e can be interpreted as the innovation size.    We further assume that e 
is an exogenous parameter of the model. 
The market demand is a linear form for a homogeneous product and is given by: 
p = a – (qL + qM + qH),                                                                                                (1) 
where  p  is  the  market  price  of  the  product  and  qi  is  the  quantity  of  the  product 
supplied to firm i, where i = L, M, H.    The benchmark model assumes there is no 
licensing action and the three firms engage in a Cournot competition.    Hence, their 
initial payoffs are, respectively: 
pL
0 = [(a – c + 5e) / 4]
2, pM
0 = [(a – c + e) / 4]
2, pH
0 = [(a – c – 3e) / 4]
2.                  (2) 
We  focus  our  analysis  on  a  non-drastic  innovation  case,  and  hence  we  have  a 
non-drastic innovation condition, i.e., e £ (a – c) / 3, let pH
0 > 0. 
Given the innovation size, Firm L has three kinds of licensing strategy.    Under 
the fixed-fee licensing method, the patent is transferred against a fixed fee.    Under 
the royalty licensing method, the patent holder decides the optimal royalty rate of per 
unit output to transfer the patent.    Under the auction licensing method, the innovator transfers the technology using a first-price auction, and the highest bidder obtains the 
innovation. 
This  is  a  three-stage  game.    In  the  first  stage,  the  patent  holder  decides  the 
licensing strategy.    In the second stage, it decides how many firms it will transfer the 
licensing to, i.e., Firm M, Firm H, or both.    In the third stage, the three firms compete 
in quantities. 
 
2.1 Fixed-fee licensing method 
Under the fixed-fee licensing mode, the innovator decides to whom to license the 
patent  by  comparing  the  size  of  the  total  profit  that  is  made  up  of  the  market 
competitive profit and the fixed-fee licensing revenue.    We are thus able to derive: 
ÕL
FB = pL
FB + FB = [(a – c + 2e) / 4]
2 + (1/16)[-2e
2 + 12(a – c)e],                            (3a) 
ÕL
FM = pL
FM + FM = [(a – c + 4e) / 4]
2 + (1/16)[15e
2 + 6(a – c)e],                          (3b) 
ÕL
FH = pL
FH + FH = [(a – c + 3e) / 4]
2 + (1/16)[12(a – c)e].                                    (3c) 




FH represent the total profit of Firm L under the fixed-fee 
licensing mode when Firm L licenses to either or both of the firms, namely, Firm M 
and Firm H, respectively; the symbols pL
FB, pL
FM, and pL
FH represent the competitive 
profit of Firm L in the product market under the fixed-fee licensing contract when 
Firm  L  licenses  to  either  or  both  of  the  firms,  Firm  M  and  Firm  H,  respectively.   
Similarly, the symbols FB, FM, and FH represent the licensing revenue of Firm L under 
the fixed-fee licensing contract when Firm L licenses to either or both of the firms, 
Firm M and Firm H, respectively. 
We compare the magnitudes of ÕL
FB, ÕL
FM, and ÕL






FH for 0 < e < (2/11)(a – c), 
ÕL
FM > ÕL
FH for e > (2/11)(a – c).                                                                              (4) 
Hence, we conclude that, under the fixed-fee licensing mode, the patent holder will 
license to a high cost firm when the innovation size is small; the innovator will license 
to a low cost firm when the innovation size is large. 
 
2.2 Royalty licensing method 
Under the royalty licensing mode, the total profit of the patent holder is derived 
from the profit obtained by selling the product and the licensing revenue is obtained 
by means of the royalty licensing mode.    The total profits of the innovator under the 
different situations are shown as: 
ÕL
RB = pL
RB + RB = [(a – c + 2e) / 2]
2,                                                                      (5a) 
ÕL
RM = pL
RM + RM = [(7a – 7c + 28e) / 22]
2 + [(3a – 3c + 12e) / 11][(a – c + 4e) / 22],                (5b) 
ÕL
RH = pL
RH + RH 
= [(7a – 7c + 21e) / 22]
2 + [(3a – 3c + 9e) / 11][(a – c + 3e) / 22].                  (5c) 




RH represent the total profit of Firm L under the royalty 
licensing mode when Firm L licenses to either or both of the firms, Firm M and Firm 
H, respectively; the symbols pL
RB, pL
RM, and pL
RH represent the competitive profit of 
Firm  L  in  the  product  market  under  the  royalty  licensing  contract  when  Firm  L 
licenses to either or both of the firms, Firm M and Firm H, respectively.    Similarly, 
the  symbols  RB,  RM,  and  RH  represent  the  licensing  revenue  of  Firm  L  under  the 
royalty licensing contract when Firm L licenses to either or both of the firms, Firm M 
and Firm H, respectively. 
We compare the magnitudes of ÕL
RB, ÕL
RM, and ÕL




RH "e.                                                                                            (6) 
According to the result in Equation (6), we conclude that under the royalty licensing 
method, it is beneficial for the licensor to license to both firms.    The reason is that 
the inside patent holder can use the royalty rate to influence the two rivals’ marginal 
production costs. 
 
2.3 Auction licensing method 
Under the auction licensing method, the maximum that a producing firm can pay 
the patent holder to obtain a new technology is its payoff when it gets the patent, 
however, the rival will fail to get minus its payoff when the rival succeeds in getting 
the patent while it fails. 
We obtain the total profits that arise as Firm L licenses to Firm M or Firm H by 
means of the auction licensing method as: 
ÕL
AM = [(a - c + 4e) / 4]
2 + 5e(2a – 2c + 3e) / 16,                                                    (7a) 
ÕL
AH = [(a - c + 3e) / 4]
2 + 7e(2a – 2c - e) / 16.                                                      (7b) 
We explain the calculation process in Appendix C.    The symbols ÕL
AM and ÕL
AH 
represent the total profit of Firm L under the auction licensing method when Firm M 
or  Firm  H  obtains  the  patent  by  auction,  respectively.    By  comparing  these  two 
equations above, we have: 
ÕL
AM < ÕL
AH for 0 < e < 2(a – c) / 29, 
ÕL
AM > ÕL
AH for e > 2(a – c) / 29.                                                                              (8) 
According to the above result, we conclude that, under the auction licensing method, 
the patent holder will license to a high cost firm when the innovation size is small; on 
the contrary, the patent holder will license to a low cost firm when the innovation size 
is large.  
3. The optimal licensing strategy 
In this section, we use a geometric figure to find the optimal licensing method and 
which firm is to be licensed.    Figure 1 shows that the patent holder will obtain the 
lowest profit if it does not license to any firm, and the optimal licensing method for 
the producing patent holder will be to license to both firms by means of the royalty 
licensing  method.    In  other  words,  the  auction  licensing  method  is  not  the  best 
licensing method when the licensor is a producing patent holder.    Our result differs 
in this respect from that of Kabiraj (2004), who claimed that the optimal licensing 
method is the auction licensing method when the licensor is a non-producing patent 
holder.    We shall now provide an explanation for this different result.    Our model 
setup  differs  in  three  respects  from  that  of  Kabiraj  (2004).    The  first  is  that  the 
licensor  is  the  producing  patent  holder  in  our  model,  but  the  licensor  is  the 
non-producing patent holder in the Kabiraj model.    The second is that the market 
structure in our model is the Cournot market structure, while the market structure in 
the Kabiraj model is the Stackelberg market structure.    The third is that the firms are 
asymmetric producers in our model, while the firms are symmetric producers in the 
Kabiraj  model.    Hence,  the  differences  in  the  results  between  our  model  and  the 
Kabiraj  model  are  caused  by  these  three  factors.    However,  the  main  factor  that 
makes the results different is the first one.    Since the auction licensing method does 
not change the rival’s production behavior, the patent producing licensor in our model 
does  not  adopt  the  auction  licensing  method.    In  order  to  change  the  rival’s 
production  behavior,  the  producing  licensor  in  our  model  will  adopt  the  royalty 
licensing method to license to both firms. 
Besides, our result can also be compared with the finding of Fosfuri and Roca 
(2004).    Our model setup only differs in one respect from Fosfuri and Roca (2004).   
It is that there are asymmetric producers in our model, but symmetric producers in the 
Fosfuri and Roca model.    Except for the difference in the model setup referred to 
above, the model setup for both our model and for the Fosfuri and Roca model are 
similar in that they both have a producing patent and product licensor and a Cournot 
market  structure.    In  their  article,  Fosfuri  and  Roca  only  compare  the  fixed-fee 
licensing method with the royalty licensing method, and find that when the producing 
patent  holder  licenses  to  all  firms,  the  best  licensing  method  is  the  royalty  rate. 
However, if the patent holder licenses to only certain of the firms, then a fixed-fee 
contract will replace a royalty contract as the optimal choice.    However, we reach a 
different conclusion to that of Fosfuri and Roca (2004).    In this study, we can show 
that if the producing patent holder only licenses to one firm, then the royalty licensing 
method always dominates the fixed-fee licensing method, i.e., Max {ÕL
RM, ÕL
RH} > Max {ÕL
FH, ÕL
FM}.    The proof of this process appears in Appendix D.    We provide 
the economic intuition of this result as follows.    There are two differences between 
our  study  and  Fosfuri  and  Roca  (2004).    First,  our  model  features  asymmetric 
producers, while there are symmetric producers in the Fosfuri and Roca model setup.   
Second,  our  model  implicitly  assumes  that  the  producing  patent  holder  can 
endogenously choose which firm it licenses to; however, which firm is licensed to is 
an exogenous decision in the Fosfuri and Roca model setup.    Hence, the parameter 
space where ÕL
FH > ÕL
RH in the Fosfuri and Roca model holds despite there being 
asymmetric producers.    In other words, in our model, if the producing patent holder 
only licenses to one firm, then it will license to the low cost firm by means of the 
royalty licensing method.    In the Fosfuri and Roca model, both licensees have the 
same production cost, and so the producing licensor will only license to one of the 
licensees by means of the fixed-fee licensing method. 
 
 
Figure 1.    The Optimal Licensing Mode 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we discuss the optimal licensing strategy in which the licensor is a 
producing patent holder.    The producing patent holder has three alternative licensing strategies:  fixed-fee,  royalty  rate,  and  auction.    There  are  also  different  cost 
structures between the licensor and the two licensees.    We find that when the licensor 
is a producing patent holder and each firm has a different production cost, the auction 
licensing method is not the best licensing strategy.    This result is different from the 
finding of Kabiraj (2004), which is that the auction licensing strategy is the optimal 
strategy  among  the  three  alternative  licensing  strategies  when  the  licensor  is  a 
non-producing patent holder.    Finally, we compare the licensing method between the 
fixed-fee licensing method and the royalty licensing method.    We conclude that if the 
producing  patent  holder  licenses  to  only  certain  firms,  then  the  royalty  licensing 
method is the best strategy.    This result is different from that of Fosfuri and Roca 
(2004), who concluded that if only some of the licensees obtain a licensing contract, 




When Firm L licenses to both firms by means of the fixed-fee licensing method, 
the marginal costs of the three firms amount to c - 2e, i.e., cL = cM = cH = c - 2e.   
The profit functions of three firms are each pi = (p - ci)qi, where p = a - ∑qi.    We 
derive  each  firm’s  profit  function  with  respect  to  its  quantity  and  obtain  three 
first-order  conditions.    By  setting  them  equal  to  zero,  we  can  solve  three 
simultaneous equations.    We obtain the optimal quantity qi
FB = (a - c + 2e) / 4, and 
the equilibrium profit is pi
FB = [(a - c + 2e) / 4]
2.    The superscript FB represents the 
case where both firms are licensed by means of a fixed-fee licensing method.    In the 
same way, if Firm L only licenses to Firm M, then the equilibrium quantities for the 
three  firms  are  qL
FM  =  qM
FM  =  (a  -  c  +  4e)  /  4,  and  qH
FM  =  (a  -  c  -  4e)  /  4.   
Furthermore, the equilibrium profits are pL
FM = pM
FM = [(a - c + 4e) / 4]
2, and pH
FM = 
[(a - c - 4e) / 4]
2.    The superscript FM represents the case where only Firm M is 
licensed by means of the fixed-fee licensing method.    Finally, if Firm L only licenses 
to Firm H, then the equilibrium quantities we obtain for the three firms are qL
FH = 
qH
FH = (a - c + 3e) / 4, and qM
FH = (a - c - e) / 4.    In addition, the equilibrium profits 
are pL
FH = pH
FH = [(a - c + 3e) / 4]
2, and pM
FH = [(a - c - e) / 4]
2.    The superscript 
FH  represents  the  case  where  only  Firm  H  is  licensed  by  means  of  the  fixed-fee 
licensing method. 
When Firm L licenses to both firms by means of the fixed-fee licensing method, 






12(a – c)e].    When Firm L licenses to Firm M by means of fixed-fee licensing, the 
licensing revenue for Firm L is FM = (pM
FM - pM
0) = (1/16)[15e
2 + 6(a – c)e].    In 
addition,  when  Firm  L  licenses  to  Firm  H  by  adopting  the  fixed-fee  licensing approach, the licensing revenue for Firm L is FH = (pH
FH - pH
0) = (1/16)[12(a – c)e]. 
In summarizing the above analysis, the total profits for Firm L under the fixed-fee 
licensing mode when Firm L licenses to either or both of the firms, Firm M and Firm 
H are ÕL
FB = pL
FB + FB, ÕL
FM = pL
FM + FM, and ÕL
FH = pL
FH + FH.    They are 
explicitly shown in Equations (3a), (3b), and (3c) in Section 2. 
 
Appendix B 
When Firm L licenses to both firms by means of the royalty licensing method, the 
marginal costs of the two licensees (Firm M and Firm H) are c - 2e + r, i.e., cM = cH = 
c - 2e + r.    The profit functions of the two licensees are pM = (p - c + 2e - r)qM, and 
pH = (p - c + 2e - r)qH.    However, the profit function of the licensor is pL = (p - c + 
2e)qL, where p = a - ∑qi.    We derive Firm i’s profit function with respect to qi and 
obtain three first-order conditions.    Let them to be zero and solve three simultaneous 
equations.    We then obtain the optimal quantities qL
RB = (a - c + 2e + 2r) / 4, and 
qM
RB = qH
RB = (a - c + 2e - 2r) / 4.    The equilibrium profits are pL




RB = [(a - c + 2e - 2r) / 4]
2.    The superscript RB represents 
the case where both firms are licensed by means of the royalty licensing method.   
According to the same calculation process, if Firm L only licenses to Firm M, then the 
optimal quantities for the three firms are qL
RM = (a - c + 4e + r) / 4, qM
RM = (a - c + 
4e - 3r) / 4, and qH
RM = (a - c - 4e + r) / 4.    The equilibrium profits are pL
RM = [(a - 
c + 4e + r) / 4]
2, pM
RM = [(a - c + 4e - 3r) / 4]
2, and pH
RM = [(a - c - 4e + r) / 4]
2.   
The superscript RM represents the case where only Firm M is licensed by means of 
the royalty licensing method.    Finally, if Firm L only licenses to Firm H, then the 
equilibrium quantities for the three firms are qL
RH = (a - c + 3e + r) / 4, qM
RH = (a - c 
- e + r) / 4, and qH
RH = (a - c + 3e - 3r) / 4.    In addition, the equilibrium profits are 
pL
RH = [(a - c + 3e + r) / 4]
2, pM
RH = [(a - c - e + r) / 4]
2, and pH
RH = [(a - c + 3e - 3r) 
/ 4]
2.    The superscript RH represents the case where only Firm H is licensed by 
means of the royalty licensing method. 
When Firm L licenses to both firms by means of the royalty licensing method, the 
total profit for Firm L is ÕL
RB = pL
RB + RB, where RB = r(qM
RB + qH
RB).    Firm L 
maximizes the total profit with respect to r and we obtain the optimal royalty rate r
RB 
= (a - c + 2e) / 2.    Similarly, when Firm L licenses to Firm M, the total profit for 
Firm L is ÕL
RM = pL
RM + RM, where RM = rqM
RM.    Firm L maximizes the total profit 
with respect to r and we obtain the optimal royalty rate r
RM = (3a - 3c + 12e) / 11.   
Finally, when Firm L licenses to Firm H, the total profit for Firm L is ÕL
RH = pL
RH + 
RH, where RH = rqH
RH.    Firm L maximizes its total profit with respect to r and we 
obtain the optimal royalty rate r
RH = (3a - 3c + 9e) / 11.    Furthermore, the optimal 
total licensing profits for Firm L ÕL
RB, ÕL
RM, and ÕL
RH are shown in Equations (5a), (5b) and (5c), respectively, in Section 2. 
 
Appendix C 
If Firm M obtains the patent by means of the auction licensing method, then the 
marginal costs for Firm L and Firm M are c - 2e.    Furthermore, the marginal cost for 
Firm H is c.    The profit functions for Firm L, Firm M, and Firm H are pL
AM = (p - c 
+ 2e)qL, pM
AM = (p - c + 2e)qM, and pH
AM = (p - c)qH, respectively.    The superscript 
AM  indicates  that  the  patent  holder  licenses  to  Firm  M  by  means  of  the  auction 
licensing method.    We derive three profit functions with respect to their quantities, 
and obtain the three first-order conditions.    Let the three first-order conditions be 
zero and solve three simultaneous equations.    The optimal quantities for the three 
firms are qL
AM = qM
AM = (a - c + 4e) / 4, qH
AM = (a - c - 4e) / 4.    In addition, the 
equilibrium profits for the three firms are pL
AM = pM
AM = [(a - c + 4e) / 4]
2, and pH
AM 
= [(a - c - 4e) / 4]
2.    Based on the same calculation process, if Firm H obtains the 
patent by means of the auction licensing method, then the optimal quantities for the 
three  firms  are  qL
AH  =  qH
AH  =  (a  -  c  +  3e)  /  4,  and  qM
AH  =  (a  -  c  -  e)  /  4.   
Furthermore, the equilibrium profits are pL
AH = pH
AH = [(a - c + 3e) / 4]
2, and pM
AH = 
[(a - c - e) / 4]
2.    The superscript AH indicates that the patent holder licenses to 
Firm H by means of the auction licensing method. 
The maximum that Firm M is willing to pay for new technology is Firm M’s profit 
when it obtains the patent, however, Firm H fails to get minus Firm M’s profit when 
Firm  H  succeeds  in  getting  the  patent  while  Firm  M  fails.    Thus,  the  maximum 
amount that Firm M can spend for getting the patent of new technology is AM = pM
AM 
- pM
AH = [(a – c + 4e) / 4]
2 – [(a – c - e) / 4]
2 = 5e(2a - 2c + 3e) / 16.    In the same 
way, the maximum amount that Firm H can spend to obtain the patent for the new 
technology is AH = pH
AH - pH
AM = [(a – c + 3e) / 4]
2 – [(a – c - 4e) / 4]
2 = 7e(2a - 2c 
- e) / 16. 
According to the above analysis, if Firm L licenses to Firm M, then the total profit 
of the licensor is ÕL
AM = pL
AM + AM; if Firm L licenses to Firm H, then the total profit 
of the licensor is ÕL
AH = pL
AH + AH.    The reduced forms for ÕL
AM and ÕL
AH are 
shown in Equations (7a) and (7b) in Section 2. 
 
Appendix D 
We have the producing patent holder’s profit functions under different licensing 
methods as follows: 
ÕL
RM  =  pL
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.                                          (A-4) 
It is obvious that ÕL
RM must be larger than ÕL
RH, i.e., Max {ÕL
RM, ÕL
RH} = ÕL
RM.   
We next compare ÕL
RM and ÕL
FH, and obtain 
ÕL
RM  -  ÕL
FH  =  ] ) ( 28 100 )[
176
1




2 2 e e e c a c a - + + - -   >  0.        (A-5) 
We finally compare ÕL
RM and ÕL
FM, and arrive at 
ÕL
RM  -  ÕL














( c a -
-
  <  e  <  ) )(
7
22 1
( c a -
+
.                                                            (A-6) 
The non-drastic innovation case requires that e Î (0, (a - c) / 3).    Hence, ÕL
RM - 
ÕL
FM > 0 must hold.    From (A-5) and (A-6), we get ÕL
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